My Experience
When I first arrived in Tanzania with my family in the mid 1960s, little did I know that we would eventually spend seven years in that country, and that that experience would determine my professional career and a large part of the rest of my life.
The 1960s was an era with a buoyant world economy and boundless enthusiasm. North America would see issues like racial segregation and the Vietnam war tackled head on by widespread civil activities. Overseas aid groups like CUSO and the Peace Corps were in their prime and developmental agencies like CIDA were growing rapidly.
I arrived in Tanzania full of bright ideas, helpful advice and ready to apply my knowledge to the problems at hand in Tanzania. I immediately began teaching at the Dar es Salaam Technical College. I was handed a City and Guilds curriculum for training technicians. This was designed for training technicians in London, England.
Only slowly did I realize that I was profoundly unaware of the subtleties of the new culture in which I was operating. During our first year in Tanzania my wife Fran and I took a long trip inland in a borrowed car. As we travelled I saw many externally-funded projects that were not functioning well. Many were operating inefficiently and some were simply abandoned. Many of these projects were the kind that I would have designed.
As I learned more of the culture and began to learn the depths of the local Swahili language, I began to better understand why people did the seemingly strange things that they did – why their concept of time was so different, why they often spoke in proverbs and riddles and why they placed so much emphasis on personal contact and communal activities.
All the while the effect of the local climate was taking hold on us. We had the dubious distinction of never having air-conditioning in all of those years of living in the hot and humid climates of Tanzania and Senegal. Our earlier fresh bouncy optimism began to whither under the hot tropical sun. I was slowly learning about the massive effect of the environment on human development. The tropical environment does not make development impossible but it surely presents obstacles (most notably tropical diseases and fatigue) that slow down the process of human development. This phenomenon has been well documented by others. (“The Tropics and Economic Development” Andrew M. Kamark, World Bank, 1976; “Guns, Germs and Steel”, Jared Diamond, 1997, ”Environment, Scarcity and Violence”, 1999, Thomas F. Homer Dixon).
My early experience in Tanzania started me on a career that led me to many consulting missions to Africa and then later to other countries in the developing world in Latin America, the Middle East and the Far East. Some of these visits involved training workshops but many times they involved missions to evaluate development projects. Annex I lists the main projects that I was involved in. The lessons I learned in some selected projects are described below.
Lessons Learned
2007 – present; Technical Advisor, WaterCan, OTTAWA and EAST AFRICA
Activities: As technical advisor with WaterCan I have visited and worked with all of the locally based water supply and sanitation NGOs that receive support from WaterCan (in Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania). I also served as a Capacity Building Coordinator during which time I did organizational assessments of all the WaterCan partners in East Africa.
Lessons: The main lesson that I learned with WaterCan over the years is that only projects that are led and driven by local personnel will be sustainable in the long run.
Another specific lesson learned was the following. One primary school in Uganda had two rainwater catchment tanks that were leaking. They then proceeded to build a third one. Why? Because somebody else was paying for it. This decision made no environmental or economic sense. They should have instead repaired the two tanks that were leaking, but were otherwise in good working order. The undue influence of outside funding and poor technical management was evident here. Here as in many other cases, a proper feasibility study could have revealed the most efficient and economical choice. My training workshop notes discuss this in more detail.
Documentation
“Water Supply Workshop: Training Notes:, WaterCan, Nov. 2008, Eric Schiller, Technical Advisor
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2005 Tsunami Relief , World Vision/Cowater International, SRI LANKA
Activities: During this mission I prepared water and sanitation rehabilitation programs for the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka after the tsunami of December, 2004. During this time I encountered the Canadian Disaster Assistance Relief Team (DART) which was working in the same region. They were part of a $15 million project. They were supplying drinking water using reverse osmosis water treatment technology. In the same area local people working with World Vision using rapidly constructed shallow wells and pumps were supplying the same amount of potable water for less than $1000.
Lesson: Before sending a large-scale foreign technology into a disaster zone, send in experienced personnel to work with local personnel to determine the best technology and management methods to respond to the crisis.
Documentation
“Mission Report : Watsan Planning – Eastern Province, Sri Lanka” prepared by Eric Schiller for World Vision/Cowater International, March 2005.
“DART Water Mission” submitted to DND and CIDA by Eric Schiller (Annex 2)
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2003-4, Consultant, Water Demand Management project, IDRC, MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA (MENA)
Activities: I visited the following countries in the MENA region; Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco. The object of this IDRC supported project was to find ways to conserve water use by investigating water conservation and recycling methods in the region. My task was to learn the procedures being practiced by the various countries.
Lessons: When water is scarce, as it surely is in the MENA region, instead of seeking new water sources it is necessary to reduce consumption by water demand management. This includes technological, legal, economic, educational and cultural approaches. The reuse of wastewater was a major technique involved in this process. A major lesson learned here was that changing human behavior often trumps technological solutions. Therefore socio-economic approaches were very important.
Documentation
“Water Demand Management (WDM II) Consultative Meeting Final Report, IDRC, Cairo Egypt, 2004
2001, Appraisal of \water and Sanitation Services in Small Towns in PERU, WB/UNDP
Activities: As a consultant of the WB/UNDP I visited 6 small towns in 3 different regions of Peru (coast, Andean mountains and Amazon jungle). My mandate was to evaluate the delivery of water and sanitation services (wss) and to analyze each town’s wss management structure.
Lessons: Different towns had different management models depending on each town’s size and geographical setting. One remarkable factor that I noticed was that whatever the town’s management model it was the character and commitment of the town’s mayor that was pivotal. This was a striking feature of the best performing town that I visited.
Documentation
“Appraisal of Water and Sanitation Services in Small Towns in Peru”, by Eric J. Schiller of R.J. Burnside Intl. Ltd. For UNDP/WB, Lima, PERU, 2001
1999, Evaluation of Water Supply Systems in Five Cites, AfDB, UGANDA
Activities As a consultant with the African Development Bank (AfDB) I evaluated the performance of the water supply systems in four cities in Uganda (Mbarara, Gulu, Lira and Kamuli).
Lessons : In Kamuli I evaluated a seven million dollar water treatment plant that was not functioning properly. Because of poor operation and maintenance, the water was overly chlorinated and nobody was drinking it. Later a proper feasibility study was done and low cost efficient hand pumps were installed. The lesson here is that before beginning a project one should do a proper feasibility study to identify the most appropriate technology to be installed. Also because of the power of external funding it is possible to distort local priorities.
Document “Uganda: Five Urban Centres Water Supply and Sewerage Rehabilitation Project – Project Performance Evaluation Report” African Development Bank, 1999
1993-98, Eau et Assainissement en Afrique de l’Ouest, EIP, CIDA, BURKINA FASO
Activities: For five years I was the director of a project supported by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). The motivation for the project was to make technical training more responsive to the realities on the ground. There was also an attempt to introduce new emerging technologies using renewable energy – in this case photovoltaic energy to pump water.
Lessons: Technical training should respond to the realities on the ground. This often includes a deep awareness of the socio-economic situation which is often more important than simple technical considerations.
“Evaluation mi-parcours de projet de cooperation Eau et Assainissement”, P. Egli, 1996
“Projet d’amenageement hydraulique et d’ assainissement, Burkina Faso,
1997, Financial Evaluation of Bolivia’s Water and Sanitation project, WB, BOLIVIA
Activities: As a consultant to the World Bank I evaluated the policy of spending caps on rural water supply projects in Bolivia. The cost overruns by the largest water supply implementing agency in Bolivia (FIS) were found to be due to neglecting alternative low cost technologies, not using local low cost participation and excessively high administrative costs by FIS. Recommendations were made to change this situation.
Lessons: In general FIS was too driven by outside donor funding and not motivated to use simpler technologies and lower costs more using local participation. The World Bank is to be commended for doing this study to put a brake on excessive costs and overly sophisticated technologies in rural areas where they are not appropriate.
Document
Report of a Financial Evaluation (Spending Caps) ; Bolivia Rural Water and Sanitation Project” submitted to the World Bank by Eric Schiller for Cowater International Inc. , March, 1997
1998-90, Water and Sanitation Specialist, CIDA, SENEGAL, WESTERN AFRICA, SOUTHERN AFRICA
Activities: I worked in the Professional Services Branch of CIDA as a water and sanitation specialist.
During this time I visited Senegal, Burkina faso, Ghana and Southern Africa to evaluate CIDA projects.
Lessons learned: I had occasion to visit a handpump maintenance project in northern Ghana that was sponsored by UNDP. Maintenance teams were required by the donor to have a gender balance in their operation and maintenance (O/M) activities. Some maintenance teams were composed entirely of women (See photos in Annex 3). This is an example where donor influence was effective in promoting radical cultural changes. This is one of the rare occasions where outside donor influence may have been useful. In many situations this is a hazardous procedure and whether the above cultural changes will become permanent is still to be verified.
While travelling from Burkina Faso to Ghana I discovered one of the most inappropriate technologies that I have ever seen. An American NGO had a rainwater catchment and water treatment system entirely underground at great cost. Nearby was a simple handpump and borehole that delivered more potable water at a fraction of the cost. (See annex 4, Diagrams and photo)
There are many non-functioning, western imposed water projects in Africa. They are often turnkey stand-alone projects. These originally seem to be easy to maintain but in the end they end up as failures. The choice of technology must correspond with the existing level of infrastructure that will be necessary to maintain that technology in the long term.
1985-86, “Technical Evaluation of Urban and Rural Water Supply Systems”, prepared for CIDA, GHANA
Activities: I was the principal consultant for an extensive evaluation of a large scale CIDA project (6 towns and 300 handpumps) in the Upper Region of Ghana. The project was characterized by:
Canadian made handpumps were initially installed with no financial plan for O/M procedures in place. Subsequently a training phase WUP (Water Utilization Program) had to be implemented. This was because the Canadian pumps broke down frequently and needed constant maintenance.
In the towns, unrealistically sophisticated technologies were installed. For example a Degremont water treatment system in Bolgatanga required a 24/7 electrical supply but daily electrical outages were very common.
Lessons:
Don’t install free handpumps with no O/M schedule in place.
Do a proper feasibility study before you install sophisticated western technologies in a developing country.
Document
“Technical Evaluation of Urban and Rural Water Supply Systems ; Ghana Upper Region Water Programme Evaluation Report” prepared for CIDA, 1986 by Malone, Givens and Parsons Ltd. Principal consultant Eric J. Schiller with contributions by Lee Parsons, Steve Abbot, Linda Becker, Alan Etherington and Bipin Joshi.
Review of Human Development by Other Analysts
As a result of my experiences abroad it is clear that people on the ground must own and manage their own development process. Projects imposed by outside development agencies without adequate consultation and collaboration usually end up as failures. This fundamental fact has been observed by others who have done extensive analyses on the process of development.
People who analyze development aid tend to be found in two general groupings – those who are very critical of the present model and call for radical change and those who while still critical believe that some modification of the existing model of development will greatly improve things.
In the first group is found William Easterly (“The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s effort to aid the rest has done so much ill and so little good”) and Dambisa Moyo (“Dead Aid: Why aid is not working and how there is a better way for Africa”).
The analysis of Easterly fits in well with what I have experienced in the field. Easterly was an economist for the World Bank for 16 years. He noticed that the WB regularly sets targets for its development programs and then these targets are regularly not met. He shows that most of these development programs (i.e. Millennium Development Project, NEPAD, etc.) are formulated by “central planners” in the developed world, usually by personnel in development agencies (WB, UNDP, USAID, CIDA etc.). These grand plans are not truly generated by local personnel. Without active local support these top-down programs do not achieve their stated goals. Instead the development agencies tend to emphasize how the funds were reimbursed and spent. Easterly says that what we need are local “seekers” on the ground. These people, familiar with local conditions can determine concrete obstacles to development. Being informed of these obstacles, donor agencies can then be asked to come alongside to assist local personnel to achieve their own development aims.
Dambesa Moyo (“Dead Aid: Why aid is not working and how there is a better way for Africa”) is also a fierce critic of past development efforts. She says that foreign aid has created dependence, corruption, poor governance and poverty in developing countries. Her solution is a private sector emphasis to solve Africa’s problems. Without proper regulation one should be very wary of this approach.
As opposed to the above points of view there are those who claim that what Africa needs is not less but more aid. Many politicians, aid groups and some celebrity fundraisers like Bono and Bob Geldof would fit into this group.
Jeffrey Sachs (“The End of Poverty”) has an optimistic view of development. He has stated that with the right policies and key interventions extreme poverty can be eliminated in 20 years. He believes that a key element in accomplishing this is in raising the amount of money spent on development aid. He recognizes the role of geography and climate but stresses that these problems can be overcome. He puts great reliance on technological innovation and re-ordered financial structures. From 2002 – 2006 he was director of the Millennium Project.
Easterly has been one of the most outspoken critics of Sachs. He questions whether the way out of poverty is massive scaled-up aid. It can be shown that many emerging markets have emerged out of poverty without huge amounts of development aid.
Another critic of the development aid system is Paul Collier (“The Bottom Billion: Why the poorest countries are failing and what can be done about it”). He identifies the following obstacles to development: (1) conflict (civil wars use up valuable resources), (2) natural resource trap (resources often are fought over, resources allow governments to continue in power without citizen support, and (3) bad governance. Collier prefers to work through a new regulatory climate emphasizing preferential trade policies for developing countries and anti-corruption measures.
Good governance all that is implied in this is the solution for Africa’s problems, but how is that to be achieved? All the evidence suggests that it will be a long struggle to achieve this goal. It was a long struggle to achieve democracy in Europe and there is no indication that it will be achieved any faster in Africa or in any other developing regions of the tropical zone.
Conclusion
So what are we left with? After many years of involvement in the development process. I have come to the following conclusions:
1) Local partners must own, control and direct projects for their own development
2) Inherent in the above is the need for good governance. By this I mean a government that seeks the common good and not just the benefit of a chosen few. This is a precondition for sustainable development.
3) Our task in the developed world is to find honest, transparent and efficient partners overseas and work with them.
4) I believe that smaller projects that develop from the bottom up are more efficient than larger top down projects.
5) I do not believe that the solution lies in more development aid funds, but in smarter more intelligent use of aid funds.
6) Initial technologies introduced into developing countries should be able to be maintained and sustained within the existing infrastructure. This will mean that at the beginning of development process technologies should be as simple as possible to achieve the desired goals.
7) Technological development should proceed in orderly steps. A new level of technology should only be envisioned when the required infrastructure (services such as roads, transport, electricity, water supply, education and educated personnel) and materials (spare parts, minerals and other resources) are present.
8) Our task in the developing world is to come along side credible partners in the developing world and assist them. Our role is not to direct the process.
9) We do have an important role to play at home in the development process. It is true that activities in the developed world impact on poorer countries. For example wealthy countries subsidize their own farmers and thus cripple exports of agricultural goods from developing countries. Mining companies active in developing countries are often poorly regulated and at times do environmental damage and do not respect labour and human rights regulations. Trade is often not fair, in that we extract minerals and resell manufactured goods to the developing world. All of this needs to change.
We have a role to play in this.
Annexes
I – Overseas Professional Activities
2 - DART Mission Report
3 – Women maintenance workers in northern Ghana
4 – Underground RWCS project at Po
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